WHY TURKEY REJECTED THE 1 MARCH MOTION: A NEO-CLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE

Why Turkey rejected the 1 March Motion:

A Neo-Classical Realist Perspective

Abstract:

This article examines why the 1 March motion failed from a Neo-Classical Realist perspective. It starts by providing background information on the world system during the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, and the emergence of a multipolar world system. The article then explores how domestic factors, such as conflicts within the AKP and public opinion, played a significant role in Turkey's decision not to support the motion. It also highlights that Turkey's threat perceptions towards Iraq were not as hostile as those of the United States. The article concludes that the failure of the 1 March Motion was a turning point in bilateral relations between the USA and Turkey, as Turkey used to be a strategic partner but was no longer seen as such as Joseph Nye

Introduction

During the cold war world were divided by 2 superpowers as, USA and USSR and we call that international world system as a “bipolar system”. At that time Turkey had to pick a side beacuse a ccountry that doesn’t take any sides may face the danger of extinction. There wasn’t much option for the Turks, therefore Turkey have joined the NATO alliance rather than being neutral due to USSR threats and pro american government. After the collapse of the USSR, the USA became a only remained super power and we call that 90s areas as a unipolar world system. Because at that time period, there were not any country that could challange the USA until the 9/11. After the terror attack American image damaged and it showed to the world that how the USA was vulnerable. So, this period called as a “multipolar world system” by many academicians such as Joseph Nye

Neoclasical Perspective

Domestic factors are important in the perspective on the Neo-Classical Realism. Because of the conflicts within the AKP, unpopularity and hate against the USA in the public opinion there wasn’t any leader who could take all the responsibility and force the limits in order to accept 1 March Motion. Although there was important politicians who wanted such as Erdogan. 

Another NCR perspective is, Iraq wasn’t threat for the Turkey. Turkish threat perceptions toward Iraq wasn’t hostile as much as USA. No doubt, Iraq was a threat for the Turkey because of Iraq arsenals. But Turkey under-balanced Iraq because Iraq wasn’t seem as a big threat for Turkey to fight. On the other hand, Iraq was evil in the American opinion because Saddam was financing terror organizations which caused 9/11 attack. 

Examing the first Gulf War,

In the first Gulf War, Turkey’s president were Turgut Özal and he managed the Turkey during that time period. Özal dominated the decision making process even he hadn’t enough authority to do so. He voted pro for the Invasion of the Iraq. For better understanding firstly, it is necessary to understand international situation of that time period. During Özal leadership for the international perspective, Turkey hadn’t much choices because of the unipolar system. the USA had a legitimate casus belli due to the Saddam regime’ aggression and ruthlessness. This combination created huge coalition which includes islamic nations against the Iraq aggression.

Secondly, well propaganda affected public opinion of the Turkey to be closer the USA. Özal was a charismatic and different than former presidents. His behaviors and self confident let him to do take many actions on by own or with the support of the other state actors when it is necessary. (Cühadar, 2014)

Examing the Second Gulf War

 In the second Gulf War, Turkey were managing by the AKP. It is important to understand, At that time era the world system was “multipolar system” therefore Turkey had choices rather than depending on the USA which eliminated fear of abandonment. At that time AKP was newly elected and Erdogan wasn’t deputy or minister due to the political ban. Therefore, party imagine was two headed leadership.Elites of the party had inner conflicts because AKP was the party that embraces many political opinions. Gül acted like a middle man didn’t imposed his opinions necessarily, Bülent Arınç was another important actor in the AKP and he absolutely rejected 1 March Motion. Erdoğan had many meetings with the US officials even he wasn’t officially politician and he was closely to support 1 Marh Motion but he didn’t resist and publicly support his perspective because of the domestic factors and politics. 

Why Turkey didn’t accept 1 March Motion?

Firstly, leadership affect. Newly elected party didn’t want to risk theirself and didn’t take responsibility. There wasn’t any leader who could take all the risk. They also asked the opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces opinion but TAF decided to follow the politicians. Therefore, they decided to act with the permission of the parliament. And the result was shocking. Parliament rejected the 1 March Motion even it was a favor of the Turkey’ demands.(Kesgin, 2010)

Secondly, Fear of entrapment which means being dragging into the conflict by an ally. Turkish actors and public knew the results of the first Gulf War. Turkey economy suffered after the war and Turkey had to accept over than 500.000 Kurdish imigrants. Also, destablization could occur in the area. Which could create power gap and engrowing PKK power would create a Kurdish state and bring more problems to the Turkey. So, it was a threat to the existence of the Turkey

Thirdly, Public opinion was against the war. Because American’ casus belli wasn’t legitimate as before the first Gulf War. American against war on teror wasn’t enough legitimite and excuses such as Iraq had a nuclear weapons wasn’t convinient. 

 As a result failiure of the 1 March Motion, it was a turning point in bilateral relations among the USA and Turkey. Turkey used to be a strategic parnet but after that turning point it wasn’t no longer. We saw that such a this high politics, fpa decision, was taken by the parliament.(Taydaş, 2012)

In conclusion, the failure of the 1 March Motion can be examined through a Neo-Classical Realist perspective. Domestic factors, such as conflicts within the AKP and public opinion, played a significant role in Turkey's decision not to support the motion. Additionally, Turkey's threat perceptions towards Iraq were not as hostile as those of the United States. In the first Gulf War, Turkey's decision to support the invasion of Iraq was influenced by its limited choices in a unipolar world system and strong propaganda. However, in the second Gulf War, Turkey had more choices in a multipolar world system, but leadership conflicts and fear of entrapment contributed to the decision not to support the motion. The public opinion in Turkey was also against the war, and the American casus belli was not considered legitimate enough. The failure of the 1 March Motion marked a turning point in bilateral relations between the USA and Turkey, and Turkey's status as a strategic partner was no longer assured.

References,

Barış Kesgin, 2010, When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision

Esra Cuhadar, 2014, ,Examining leaders’ orientations to structural constraints: Turkey’s 1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions

Zeynep Taydaş, 2012, A Divided Government, an Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey’s Indecision about Joining the Iraq War